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Abstract: This paper provides a critique of the DSGE models that have come to dominate macroeco-
nomics during the past quarter-century. It argues that at the heart of the failure were the wrong micro-
foundations, which failed to incorporate key aspects of economic behaviour, e.g. incorporating insights 
from information economics and behavioural economics. Inadequate modelling of the financial sector 
meant they were ill-suited for predicting or responding to a financial crisis; and a reliance on represen-
tative agent models meant they were ill-suited for analysing either the role of distribution in fluctuations 
and crises or the consequences of fluctuations on inequality. The paper proposes alternative benchmark 
models that may be more useful both in understanding deep downturns and responding to them.
Keywords: DSGE, representative agent, deep downturns, economic fluctuations
JEL classification: A1, A2, E0, E1.
I. Introduction
Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models, which have played such an 
important role in modern discussions of macroeconomics, in my judgement fail to serve 
the functions which a well-designed macroeconomic model should perform. The most im-
portant challenge facing any macro-model is to provide insights into the deep downturns 
that have occurred repeatedly and what should be done in response. It would, of course, 
be even better if we had models that could predict these crises. From a social perspective, 
whether the economy grows next year at 3.1 per cent or 3.2 per cent makes little difference. 
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But crises, when GDP falls and unemployment increases significantly, have large conse-
quences for individual well-being now, as well as for future growth. In particular, it is now 
well recognized that periods of extended economic weakness such as confronted by the US 
and Europe after 2008 have significant implications for future potential growth.1,2
While the 2008 crisis, and the inability of the DSGE model to predict that crisis or 
to provide policy guidance on how to deal with the consequences, precipitated current 
dissatisfaction with the model, the failings are deeper: the DSGE model fails similarly 
in the context of other deep downturns.
The DSGE models fail in explaining these major downturns, including the source of 
the perturbation in the economy which gives rise to them; why shocks, which the sys-
tem (in these models) should have been able to absorb, get amplified with such serious 
consequences; and why they persist, i.e. why the economy does not quickly return to 
full employment, as one would expect to occur in an equilibrium model. These are not 
minor failings, but rather go to the root of the deficiencies in the model.3
What we seek from a ‘benchmark model’ in macroeconomics is not always clear. 
Vines (written correspondence) suggests that we should be looking ‘for a simple model 
which we could teach to graduate students to provide them with a less misleading 
framework on which to build whatever research project they are engaged with.
Blanchard (2017) suggests:
The models should capture what we believe are the macro-essential character-
istics of the behavior of firms and people, and not try to capture all relevant 
dynamics. Only then can they serve their purpose, remain simple enough, and 
provide a platform for theoretical discussions.
Thus, a distinction is often made between the core DSGE model as a benchmark 
model and the variety of  expanded models, which introduces a large number of 
complexities—more shocks than just technology shocks; and more frictions than 
just nominal wage and price rigidities.4 To be sure, as many users of  DSGE models 
1 This implies that macro-econometrics should use a Bayesian loss function with a high weight in 
explaining/predicting deep downturns. This is markedly different from assessing models by looking at how 
well they match particular co-variances or moments. Practitioners of DSGE macro-econometrics claim to 
use Bayesian estimation approaches, by which they mean they include priors (e.g. concerning the values of 
certain parameters). I emphasize here another aspect: a loss function which puts high weight on being able to 
predict the events we care about. In terms of priors, the following discussion make clear that I find some of 
the priors embedded in the standard model less than persuasive.
2 DSGE models are, of course, not really a model of medium- to long-term growth: that is determined 
by factors like the pace of innovation and the accumulation of human capital on which they provide little 
insight. To understand the former, for instance, one needs a much more detailed analysis of technological 
progress, including investments in basic research and the transmission of knowledge across and within firms, 
than any standard macro-model can provide.
3 There are a myriad of versions of the DSGE model, and some versions may have attempted to address 
one or the other of the concerns I raise. I cannot in the confines of this short article explain why the purported 
remedies do not adequately address the problems.
4 See Smets and Wouters (2003). They introduce a total of ten ‘shocks’—‘two “supply” shocks, a prod-
uctivity and a labour supply shock, (…) three “demand” shocks (a preference shock, a shock to the invest-
ment adjustment cost function, and a government consumption shock), three “cost-push” shocks ((…) to the 
mark-up in the goods and labour markets and (…) to the required risk premium on capital) and two “mon-
etary policy” shocks’—and multiple frictions, including ‘external habit formation in consumption’, a ‘cost 
of adjusting the capital stock’, and ‘partial indexation of the prices and wages that cannot be re-optimised’.
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have become aware of  one or more of  the weaknesses of  these models, they have 
‘broadened’ the model, typically in an ad hoc manner.5 There has ensued a Ptolemaic 
attempt to incorporate some feature or another that seems important that had previ-
ously been left out of  the model. The result is that the models lose whatever elegance 
they might have had and claims that they are based on solid microfoundations are 
weakened,6 as is confidence in the analyses of  policies relying on them. The resulting 
complexity often makes it even more difficult to interpret what is really going on.
And with so many parameters, macro-econometrics becomes little more than an 
exercise in curve fitting, with an arbitrarily chosen set of moments generated by the 
model contrasted with reality. Standard statistical standards are shunted aside. Korinek 
(2017) provides a devastating critique:
First, the time series employed are typically detrended using methods such as 
the HP filter to focus the analysis on stationary fluctuations at business cycle fre-
quencies. Although this is useful in some applications, it risks throwing the baby 
out with the bathwater as many important macroeconomic phenomena are non-
stationary or occur at lower frequencies. An example of particular relevance in 
recent years are the growth effects of financial crises.
Second, for given detrended time series, the set of moments chosen to evaluate 
the model and compare it to the data is largely arbitrary—there is no strong 
scientific basis for one particular set of moments over another. The macro pro-
fession has developed certain conventions, focusing largely on second moments, 
i.e. variances and covariances. However, this is problematic for some of the most 
important macroeconomic events, such as financial crises, which are not well 
captured by second moments. Financial crises are rare tail events that introduce 
a lot of skewness and fat tails into time series. As a result, a good model of finan-
cial crises may well distinguish itself  by not matching the traditional second 
moments used to evaluate regular business cycle models, which are driven by a 
different set of shocks. In such instances, the criterion of matching traditional 
moments may even be a dangerous guide for how useful a model is for the real 
world. For example, matching the variance of output during the 2000s does not 
generally imply that a model is a good description of output dynamics over the 
decade.
Third, for a given set of moments, there is no well-defined statistic to meas-
ure the goodness of fit of a DSGE model or to establish what constitutes an 
5 Thus, the Smets–Wouters model introduces individual heterogeneity, but everyone has the same prefer-
ences, there are no capitalists or workers, and accordingly no differences in marginal propensities to consume. 
In this context, redistributions have no effect on aggregate demand. Below, we argue that redistributions may 
matter.
6 A claim that is already stretched when it comes to the use of an aggregate production function (see 
below) and the derivation of the demand for money. There are, of course, assumptions that seem to provide 
microfoundations, e.g. the derivation of the demand for money based on the assumption that there is a ‘cash 
in advance’ requirement. But credit, not cash, or money as it is usually defined, is typically required. See 
Greenwald and Stiglitz (2003). Many models embrace a ‘cop-out’, putting money into the utility function. 
Later, I will explain why one can’t rely for policy analyses on results derived from these ‘toy’ models, or mod-
els embracing such ad hoc assumptions.
Joseph E. Stiglitz72
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/oxrep/article-abstract/34/1-2/70/4781816
by Milbank Memorial Library user
on 20 June 2018
improvement in such a framework. Whether the moments generated by the 
model satisfactorily match the moments observed in the real world is often 
determined by an eyeball comparison and is largely at the discretion of the 
reader. The scientific rigor of this method is questionable.
Fourth, [DSGE models] frequently impose a number of restrictions that are in 
direct conflict with micro evidence. If  a model has been rejected along some 
dimensions, then a statistic that measures the goodness-of-fit along other dimen-
sions is meaningless.
Korinek’s conclusion, that ‘the scientific rigor’ of this methodology is ‘questionable’, 
must be considered an understatement.7
Sometimes, too, a distinction is made between a ‘policy model’, giving practical 
advice on what to do in different circumstances, and a model with sound theoretical 
underpinnings. Thus, the standard Keynesian model might (it could be argued) be 
good enough for telling us whether and how to stimulate the economy, but the fact 
that its underlying equations are not microfounded makes it theoretically unaccepta-
ble; for good theory, we have to turn to DSGE models. These distinctions are, I think, 
wrong on two accounts. First, as I explain below, I believe the core DSGE models is 
not good theory: good theory is based on how firms and households actually behave 
and markets actually work.8 If  credit availability is more important than interest rates, 
then a model which assumes that there is no credit rationing is bad theory. In the crisis, 
banks couldn’t get access to funds; they were liquidity constrained. Such constraints 
are not consistent with the underlying DSGE model. And second, the reason for hav-
ing a model derived with microfoundations is that a policy change could change certain 
aspects of previously observed reduced form relationships. One has to have a theory to 
ascertain whether it would. Good policy requires an understanding of the underlying 
determinants of behaviour.
So too, short-term policy involves short-term forecasting. As Chairman of the 
Council of Economic Advisers—established by the US Congress to help ensure that 
the economy remain at full employment through appropriate macroeconomic interven-
tions—under President Clinton, I had the responsibility for overseeing our forecasts, 
which were also used in budgetary projections. Though it was before the development 
of the current generation of DSGE models, many of the considerations upon which 
we focused are excluded from the standard models. We were, for instance, concerned 
with changes in expectations. But analyses of expectations were (correctly, in my view) 
not based on what those might be if  it were assumed that individuals had rational 
7 I should emphasize: empirical tests should not be limited to standard statistics. On average, black holes 
don’t exist. They are rare events, but their existence plays a crucial role in confirming the theory. They would 
not be uncovered through a standard regression. A single experiment (observation) was enough to largely 
confirm Einstein’s relativity theory.
8 Thus, what is sometimes meant by providing microfoundations is providing foundations based on a par-
ticular model of human behaviour, rational individuals with perfect information operating in competitive mar-
kets, a model which has been widely discredited. Note that in the extreme ‘microfoundation fundamentalist’ 
view, an analysis of a giraffe’s behaviour could not include the assumption that it had a long neck, because we 
cannot explain either why it has a long neck or how it can survive, given that it has a long neck (assuming that 
standard models of circulatory systems could not explain how blood could be pumped that high).
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expectations, or acted as if  they did, but on survey data of what expectations are and 
have been.9
So too, we were concerned with changes in consumption. The determination of con-
sumption is, clearly, a key aspect of any good macro-model. But it is clear that in the 
short to medium term, the shifts in household savings rates are little related to the con-
siderations on which the intertemporal utility maximization of a representative agent 
focuses. That model cannot provide accurate predictions of such changes, identifying 
either shifts in preferences or technology, or even of expectations (especially if  those are 
supposed to be ‘rational’) that give rise to changes in consumption.10
Nor has the DSGE model been useful for policy design, e.g. the best way to ‘deliver’ 
a tax cut. Behavioural economics has provided, I believe, a persuasive case that savings 
behaviour is subject to nudges, in ways that are inconsistent with the standard model.11 
Importantly, differences in responses to the US tax cuts of 2008 and 2009 have more to 
do with behavioural economics than the determinants of savings behaviour incorpo-
rated into DSGE models.12
But DSGE models seem to take it as a religious tenet that consumption should be 
explained by a model of a representative agent maximizing his utility over an infinite 
lifetime without borrowing constraints.13 Doing so is called microfounding the model. 
But economics is a behavioural science. If  Keynes was right that individuals saved a 
constant fraction of their income, an aggregate model based on that assumption is 
microfounded. Of course, the economy consists of individuals who are different, but all 
of whom have a finite life and most of whom are credit constrained, and who do adjust 
their consumption behaviour, if  slowly, in response to changes in their economic envir-
onment. Thus, we also know that individuals do not save a constant fraction of their 
income, come what may. So both stories, the DSGE and the old-fashioned Keynesian, 
are simplifications. When they are incorporated into a simple macro-model, one is say-
ing the economy acts as if . . . And then the question is, which provides a better descrip-
tion; a better set of prescriptions; and a better basis for future elaboration of the model. 
The answer is not obvious. The criticism of DSGE is thus not that it involves simpli-
fication: all models do. It is that it has made the wrong modelling choices, choosing 
complexity in areas where the core story of macroeconomic fluctuations could be told 
 9 Moreover, these surveys show that different groups in the population have distinctly different beliefs 
(expectations), inconsistent with assumptions of rational expectations and common knowledge. See, for ex-
ample, Jonung (1981), Jonung and Laidler (1988), and Bruine de Bruin et al. (2010).
10 Of course, ex post, one can sometimes interpret changes in consumption as if there were a change in 
intertemporal preferences. The theory of consumer behaviour is meaningful, however, only if  preferences are 
stable or change in predictable ways.
11 See Camerer et al. (2011) and the discussion of behavioural economics and savings in the context of 
macroeconomics. There is ample evidence that individuals’ retirement savings cannot be explained within the 
standard model. See Hamermesh (1984) and Banks et al. (1998).
12 See Parker et al. (2013).
13 The fact that these constraints markedly change savings behaviour has been long recognized. See, for 
example, Newbery and Stiglitz (1982). Deaton (1991), Aiyagari (1994), and Carroll (1992, 1997, 2001) pro-
vide empirical support. A major criticism of standard DSGE models provided by Hendry and Muellbauer 
(2018) is that they ignore these constraints and assume ‘cash and other liquid assets, stock market and pen-
sion wealth minus household debt, and housing wealth as equally spendable’.
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using simpler hypotheses, but simplifying in areas where much of the macroeconomic 
action takes place.
The complexities of the DSGE model require drastic simplifications: to analyse the 
model, strong parameterizations are required. We know that the parameterizations 
used in the DSGE models (e.g. constant elasticity utility functions14) yield predictions 
that can easily be rejected (e.g. all individuals have exactly the same portfolio of risky 
assets and homothetic preferences—unitary income elasticities for all goods and unitary 
wealth elasticities for all assets15). To make matters worse, even with all the implausible 
parameterizations, the large DSGE models that account for some of the more realistic 
features of the macroeconomy are typically ‘solved’ only for linear approximations and 
small shocks—precluding the big shocks that take us far away from the domain over 
which the linear approximation has validity.16
II. The core of the failing: the wrong microfoundations
The core of the failings of the DSGE model can be traced to the attempt, decades 
ago, to reconcile macroeconomics with microeconomics. There were two approaches. 
The first was taken by real business cycle (RBC) theory and its descendant, DSGE, 
which attempted to reformulate macroeconomics by taking the microfoundations of a 
simplified version of the competitive equilibrium model—just as that model was being 
discredited by advances in behavioural economics, game theory, and the economics 
of information. That strand attempted to explain unemployment and other deviations 
from predictions of the standard competitive model by looking for the minimal change 
in that model—assuming (typically nominal) price and wage rigidities.
The second strand (see, for example, Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Kiyotaki and 
Moore (1997), Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1987a,b, 1988a,b, 1993a,b, 2003) and the ref-
erences cited there), only entering into the mainstream in the aftermath of the Great 
Recession, attempted to bring together modern micro with macro, incorporating one 
or more of the ways in which actual markets are far from perfect (‘market failures’)—
besides the possibility of nominal wage and price rigidities, and to which they gave a dif-
ferent interpretation and explanation.17 In doing so, this strand resurrected the thinking 
of Irving Fisher (1933), who promulgated a quite different version of macrodynamics 
14 It is never made clear why we should feel better about a model that assumes a constant elasticity of 
marginal utility than a model that assumes a constant savings rate.
15 This is true if  there is more than one good or more than one asset—and clearly, ‘good theory’ has to be 
consistent with that being the case. See Stiglitz (1969). Our toy models shouldn’t break down when we move 
from one good to two goods. See the discussion below.
16 More recently, techniques have been developed for solving DSGE models with non-linearities. Though 
some of the models incorporate some of the features that we argue here should be included in any good macro-
model, they still leave out many crucial features, make many unreasonable parameterizations, and test their 
models using unsatisfactory methodologies, as described elsewhere in this paper. For a survey of the advances 
in non-linear methodologies, see Fernandez-Villaverde and Levintal (2017), and the references cited there.
17 Indeed, information economics had identified the possibility of real rigidities—in competitive equilib-
rium, real wages and interest rates could be set at levels at which markets do not clear. Risk aversion and in-
strument uncertainty provide an explanation for slow adjustments. See Greenwald and Stiglitz (1989). More 
recently, Fajgelbaum et al. (2017) have provided a simple general model in which information flows more 
slowly during recessions, and so uncertainty is higher and persists.
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than the Hicksian interpretation of Keynes based on wage and price rigidity. Fisher 
emphasized the consequences of flexibility and debt-deflation. The departures from 
the standard competitive equilibrium model which play a critical role in these models 
include incomplete contracts and capital market imperfections, including those associ-
ated with imperfect information, incomplete risk markets,18 and market irrationalities. 
(Minsky (1986) was particularly influential in the latter.) It is perhaps worth noting that 
policy-makers in recent downturns—in Japan, Europe, and even the US—have been 
focused on deflation, on the possibility that prices might fall, not on price rigidities.19
In the discussion below, I illustrate the inadequacies of the DSGE framework by focus-
ing on the 2008 crisis. Some advocates of DSGE models say these models were not meant 
to address ‘once-in-a-hundred-year floods’. There are several responses to this defence. The 
first is by way of analogy: what would one think of a medical doctor who, when a patient 
comes with a serious disease, responded by saying, ‘I am sorry, but I only deal with colds’?
The second is that not only did the model fail to predict the crisis; it effectively said 
that it couldn’t happen. Under the core hypotheses (rational expectation, exogenous 
shocks), a crisis of that form and magnitude simply couldn’t occur.
Crises bring out into the open deficiencies in the model that are not so apparent in 
our smaller and more frequent fluctuations. I believe that most of the core constituents 
of the DSGE model are flawed—sufficiently badly flawed that they do not provide even 
a good starting point for constructing a good macroeconomic model. These include (a) 
the theory of consumption; (b) the theory of expectations—rational expectations and 
common knowledge; (c) the theory of investment; (d) the use of the representative agent 
model (and the simple extensions to incorporate heterogeneity that so far have found fa-
vour in the literature): distribution matters; (e) the theory of financial markets and money; 
(f) aggregation—excessive aggregation hides much that is of first order macroeconomic 
significance; (g) shocks—the sources of perturbation to the economy; and (h) the theory 
of adjustment to shocks—including hypotheses about the speed of and mechanism for 
adjustment to equilibrium or about out-of-quilibrium behaviour. I cannot review in de-
tail all of these and other failings—such as the failure to include crucial institutional 
details—in this brief note, and so I am selective, highlighting a few as examples of more 
general problems. Many of these are related. For instance, the presence of imperfect and 
asymmetric information leads to credit and equity rationing. Thus, individuals in maxi-
mizing their lifetime utility have to take into account credit constraints and, as we have 
already noted, this gives rise to a markedly different problem than that analysed in the 
standard DSGE model. One of the reasons that the representative agent model doesn’t 
work well is that some individuals are credit constrained, others are not. Moreover, nu-
merous studies (see, for example, Kim et al. (2014); Mian and Suffi (2015); Drehmann et 
al. (2017)) have emphasized the importance of debt for aggregative behaviour; but in a 
representative agent model, debt (held domestically) nets out, and therefore should have 
no role.20 At least at times, short-run to medium-term macroeconomic analysis needs 
18 The contrast with the Smets–Wouters (2003) model is clear: they assume a complete set of state-
contingent securities insuring households against variations in their income.
19 Greenwald and Stiglitz show that there will be real consequences to unexpected disinflation, including 
through real balance effects. They show that this will be so, whether the resulting redistributive effects are 
between bank lenders and firms or among firms.
20 The introduction of corporations, with corporate debt owed to households (discussed later), does not 
address the issues raised here, focusing on household debt.
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to pay careful attention to debt and real debt-dynamics. And here, institutional details 
can matter. The shift from 30-year fixed-rate mortgages to variable rate mortgages with 
shorter terms played an important role in the crisis, especially when combined with expec-
tations that were not fully rational and credit constraints: when house prices didn’t in-
crease as expected (and it should have been clear that they couldn’t increase forever at 
those rates) and homeowners faced constraints in refinancing, the bubble broke, and the 
crisis ensued.21
As I noted earlier, my approach and that of DSGE models begin with the same start-
ing point: the competitive equilibrium model of Arrow and Debreu. It is clear that that 
model cannot explain many aspects of the economy, including macroeconomic fluctuations. 
DSGE models begin with the question, what is the minimum deviation from that model 
required to match macroeconomic behaviour interpreted largely as matching moments? 
Their first answer was price and wage rigidities, with unanticipated and not fully insured 
technology shocks. When that failed to do an adequate job, they added multiple shocks and 
distortions, in a fairly ad hoc way. Standards for what was meant by ‘microfounding’ were 
similarly ad hoc: putting money into a utility function ‘explains’ money holdings, but tells 
us nothing about what happens if, for instance, credit availability changes or the probability 
distribution of monetary emissions changes as a result of a change in monetary policy.22
III. Explaining deep downturns
The approach that I am advocating begins by ascertaining which of the advances in 
modern microeconomics are most relevant for understanding the fundamental ques-
tions of macroeconomic fluctuations: the source of the shocks; amplification—why 
seemingly small or moderate shocks can have such large effects on macroeconomic vari-
ables and individual well-being; and persistence—why the effects of the shocks persist, 
with say high levels of unemployment long after the initial shock. The interpretation of 
these deep downturns should translate into policy, explaining, for instance, why govern-
ment expenditure multipliers may be quite large (consistent with the earlier amplifica-
tion analysis) and why monetary policy may be relatively ineffective. In this analysis, 
information imperfections and asymmetries and behavioural economics often play a 
central role, as do institutions and distributional effects. As I argue below, for instance, 
the ineffectiveness of monetary policy is not really attributable to the zero lower bound 
but to the behaviour of banks, the central institution in providing credit to all but the 
largest firms.23
21 This part of the story of the 2008 crisis is now well accepted. See Stiglitz (2010b,c) and Financial Crisis 
Inquiry Commission (2011).
22 The former might affect the transactions demand for money (credit, not money, is used in most trans-
actions, as noted by Greenwald and Stiglitz (2003)); the latter affects the demand for money as a store of 
value. See, for example, Tobin (1958), the critique of the portfolio separation theorem (Cass and Stiglitz, 
1970), and the implications for monetary and macro-theory (Stiglitz, forthcoming).
23 My argument corresponds closely to that of Hendry and Muellbauer (2018), who note that ‘A major 
problem with the claim of “theory consistency” is the question of “which theory?” For example, text-book 
theory, which assumes efficient and close-to-complete markets, well-informed relatively homogeneous agents, 
little uncertainty, no credit or liquidity constraints, and a stable economy, contrasts with theory that takes 
account of the asymmetric information revolution of the 1970s and early 1980s associated with Nobel prize 
winners Stiglitz, Akerlof, and Spence. Relevant theory must incorporate credit and liquidity constraints, in-
complete markets with incomplete insurance and high levels of individual and macro uncertainty.’
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Because the 2008 crisis was a financial crisis, the standard DSGE models are par-
ticularly poorly designed to analyse its origins and evolution: The central problems 
of finance—bankruptcy, debt, and asymmetric information—simply cannot arise in a 
representative agent model.24 Who is supposed to lend to whom? And only if  the repre-
sentative agent is suffering from acute schizophrenia can there be issues of information 
asymmetries, and it is hard to reconcile such schizophrenia with the usual assumptions 
concerning rationality.
Some DSGE models (e.g. Smets and Wouters, 2003) try to introduce rudimentary 
finance through having a corporate and a household sector. But the 2008 crisis can’t be 
explained within that model: it was some households borrowing from others that gave 
rise to the crisis. Besides, with a representative agent, with or without firms, finance 
would always be provided in the form of equity—so there still wouldn’t be bankruptcies 
and debt crises.25
(i) The shocks
The critique of the DSGE models’ relevance for deep downturns in general and the 
2008 crisis in particular begins with the source of the crisis itself. For instance, in (most) 
DSGE models, downturns are caused by an exogenous technology shock. In agricul-
ture, we know what a negative technology shock means—bad weather or a plague of 
locusts. But what does that mean in a modern industrial economy—an epidemic of 
some disease that resulted in a loss of collective knowledge of how to produce?26
By contrast the shocks giving rise to economic fluctuations in many, if  not most 
cases, is clearly endogenous.27 The 2008 shock was endogenous, caused by the break-
ing of the housing bubble—something that markets created, and to which misguided 
24 The Congressional inquiry into the 2008 crisis called itself  the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission 
and focused on aspects of the financial sector like credit rating agencies and the role of credit default swaps 
(CDSs), derivatives, and other complex financial instruments. The standard DSGE models have nothing to 
say about either of these: these are failings related to its inadequate treatment of the financial sector.
25 There are further criticisms of their particular formulation: with a corporate sector, wealth would have 
to include the capitalized value of future dividends (they ignore this aspect of wealth). Recent research in 
macroeconomics has focused on variations in the value of corporations relative to the value of their capital 
goods, as a result of changes, e.g. in tax laws and market power. See, for instance, Gonzales (2016), Gonzales 
and Trivin (2017), and Stiglitz (2015, 2016b).
26 Conceptually, there can be a shock to (beliefs about) the total supply of a critical natural resource—
with a belief  that, for instance, there was a large supply of oil underneath Saudi Arabia being disproved. 
While the oil crises of the 1970s were a result of an oil shock, it was politics, not a technology shock of the 
kind incorporated in DSGE models.
27 For example, inventory fluctuations. Later, we note that the economy is best described as adjusting to 
shocks through a decentralized process of wage and price adjustments. Such adjustment processes themselves 
may give rise to economic fluctuations. See, for example, Stiglitz (2016a). The one exception to the view just 
expressed, that shocks are endogenous, relates to open emerging economies, where there is some evidence that 
many, if  not most, come from abroad. But here, too, the DSGE models fail. The economy’s exposure to ex-
ogenous risks is endogenous. The ‘rules of engagement’, e.g. the rules governing capital market liberalization, 
determine the extent to which a country is affected by shocks occurring elsewhere. See Ocampo and Stiglitz 
(2008) and Stiglitz (2010a,b).
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policies may have contributed.28 And to the extent that there are exogenous shocks, 
the extent to which firms and households are exposed to those shocks is endogenous, 
affected by the structure of the market.
(ii) Finance: preventing excessive risks and designing stable 
systems
The main problem in crisis prevention today centres around preventing the financial 
sector from undertaking excessive risks and ensuring the stability of the financial sys-
tem. Policy-makers recognize that some of the most important shocks to the economy 
can come from the financial sector.
In standard models, the money demand equation is supposed to summarize all that is 
relevant for finance; and, indeed, not even that is very relevant—all that matters is that 
somehow the central bank is able to control the interest rate.29 But the interest rate for 
T-bills is not the interest rate confronting households and firms; the spread between the 
two is a critical endogenous variable.30 While large firms may turn to capital markets, 
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) rely on the banking system. Under current 
arrangements, the links between aggregate credit creation and the levers controlled by 
the regulatory authorities, including the central bank, are tenuous and variable. Among 
the most important levers are regulations that have typically not been included within 
the ambit of macroeconomic analysis.31
Moreover, finance and the structure of the financial system matter for stability. 
Understanding the structures that are most conducive to stability, and the central trade-
offs (e.g. between the ability to withstand small and large shocks) represents one of the 
areas of important advances since the crisis.32 These were questions not even posed 
within the DSGE framework—they could not be posed because they do not arise in the 
absence of a well-specified financial sector, and would not arise within a model with a 
representative financial institution.
28 See, for example, Bernanke (2009), Demyanyk and Van Hemert (2009), Sowell (2009), and Mian and 
Sufi (2015).
29 This hypothesis can be directly tested, and rejected. See Fama (2013).
30 This is one of the central points in Greenwald and Stiglitz (2003), who develop a simple model of 
banking in which the spread is determined. The importance of this spread has been noted in other papers in 
this issue. See, for example, Vines and Willis (2018). Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2012) show that the spread has 
a predictive power on economic activity.
31 And again, these levers are typically left out of the standard DSGE model, even though they may 
be far more effective. The point is simple: if  banks are constrained in their lending by capital adequacy or 
liquidity constraints, changes in those constraints can have large effects, far greater than those generated by 
the ‘substitution effects’ that arise as returns to T-bills and loans changes. See Greenwald and Stiglitz (2003). 
Changes in these rules were part of the policy strategy that helped the economy emerge from the 1991–2 re-
cession (Stiglitz, 2003).
32 While some work had begun in this area before the crisis (see Allen and Gale (2000), Greenwald and 
Stiglitz (2003), and Gallegati et al. (2008)), the crisis itself  provided enormous impetus to research in this 
area: see Haldane (2009), Allen et al. (2010), Roitman et al. (2010), Stiglitz (2010a,d), Gai and Kapadia 
(2010), Haldane and May (2011), Battiston et al. (2012a), Acemoğlu et al. (2016), and Battiston et al. (2016). 
Complexity in financial structures may make it even impossible to ascertain whether a system is systemic-
ally stable. See Roukny et al. (2017). So too, additional financial instruments can lead to greater economic 
instability (Brock et al., 2008; Caccioli et al., 2009), partly because these financial instruments create new 
betting opportunities, which enhance volatility (Guzman and Stiglitz, 2016a,b).
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One of the key reasons that representative agent models fail in enhancing under-
standing of macro-fluctuations is the pervasiveness of macroeconomic externalities—
the actions of each agent (in the aggregate) have macroeconomic consequences which 
they do not take into account. These externalities help us understand why markets on 
their own may be excessively fragile and excessively exposed to risks. Such macroeco-
nomic externalities do not arise in RBC models, and only to a limited extent in standard 
DSGE models. In the presence of incomplete risk markets and imperfect and asymmet-
ric information, pecuniary externalities matter, and the market equilibrium is in general 
not Pareto efficient (Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1986; Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis, 
1986). Corporations may, for instance, undertake excessive debt (in open economies, 
excessive dollar-denominated debt), implying that in a downturn there may be fire sales, 
with the resulting decrease in prices having balance sheet effects, amplifying the down-
turn (see the next section).33 Banks engage in contracts with each other that may be 
individually rational, but result in greater systemic risk, particularly in the face of a 
large shock.34 RBC models are structured so that these macroeconomic externalities 
don’t arise, and so markets are always efficient, even in their response to shocks; and in 
the new Keynesian models with rigid wages and prices that are their successors, they 
arise only to a limited extent.35 By contrast, they are at the centre of the alternative 
models for which we are arguing in this paper, and help explain the significant devia-
tions from efficient outcomes.
In the standard model, issues of systemic risk simply do not arise. The focus was on 
inflation, as if  excessive inflation was the major threat to economic stability. That has 
not been the case for a third of a century; but the problems posed by financial instability 
have been recurrent.
One particularly important implication of the kind of models for which I am arguing 
here, in contrast to the standard DSGE models, is that in the presence of bankruptcy 
costs, excessive diversification (capital market integration) may result in shocks being 
amplified, rather than dampened and dissipated—as assumed by the Federal Reserve 
and predicted by the standard models.36 Indeed, policy discourse based on assumptions 
underlying DSGE models had a kind of incoherence: before a crisis, the conventional 
wisdom called for diversification—as much as possible, e.g. through securitization and 
financial linkages/risk sharing. After the onset of a crisis, discourse turned to conta-
gion. The word itself, borrowed from epidemiology, suggest the opposite of diversifica-
tion: were 100 individuals with Ebola to arrive in New York, no one would recommend 
a policy of diversification, sending two to each state. Contagion arises because of  such 
linkages. Unless one has succeeded in eliminating the prospect of future crises, the 
33 See Korinek (2010, 2011a,b, 2012), Jeanne and Korinek (2010), and Dávila and Korinek (2017). 
Shleifer and Vishny (2011) provide a partial review of firesale models.
34 See, for instance, ch. 7 of Greenwald and Stiglitz (2003).
35 See Farhi and Werning (2016).
36 See, for instance, Bernanke’s remarks concerning the risk posed by the collapse of the sub-prime 
market (see Bernanke, 2009). Bankruptcy costs introduce a non-convexity in the analysis—suggesting a fun-
damental way in which the mathematics of DSGE models would have to be altered. Recent models with fi-
nancial linkages and bankruptcy costs have shown that dense networks, with many linkages, while better able 
to handle small and uncorrelated shocks, perform more poorly in response to large shocks. For analyses of 
optimal diversification, see, for example, Stiglitz (2010a,d) and Battiston et al. (2012a,b).
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design of an economic system has to take into account the functioning of the system 
both before and after a crisis, balancing the benefits of linkages before and the costs 
afterwards. The conventional wisdom never did that. This is not a minor failing, but a 
major one.
(iii) Amplification and persistence
Beyond explaining the origins of shocks and the extent to which economies get exposed 
to shocks, an adequate macro-model needs to explain how even a moderate shock has 
large macroeconomic consequences. One of the key failures in the 2008 crisis was the 
prediction that even a large sub-prime crisis would not have large economic conse-
quences because the risks had been diversified. Within the DSGE frame that was being 
used at the time by key policy-makers, this was a natural conclusion. Other models, 
however, had predicted otherwise, focusing on important amplifiers within the econ-
omy—and, indeed, some of these became part of the standard ‘explanations’ of the 
crisis.
One source of amplification is ‘balance sheet effects’, the contraction in production 
and investment that arises when firms suffer a shock to their balance sheets. Providing 
microfoundations for balance sheet effects requires an analysis of why firms can’t replace 
the lost equity with new equity, i.e. an explanation of equity rationing (see, for example, 
Greenwald et al. (1984)). Modern information-based finance provides such a theory, 
and these ideas have already been integrated into simple theoretical and applied macro-
models, in models in which firms’ supply and demand decisions are a function of their 
balance sheets (see Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993b) and Koo (2008)).37 Greenwald and 
Stiglitz show, for instance, how a price shock (resulting from, say, a shock to demand 
for the product) gets amplified through the firm’s subsequent decisions on how much to 
produce, how much labour to hire, and how much to invest.
The effects are amplified still further if  there is credit rationing. Not only is there 
a well-developed theory of credit rationing (e.g. Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981), Calomiris 
and Hubbard (1989) among others have shown that these constraints are binding in 
important sectors of the economy, and it appears that they are particularly relevant in 
those sectors subject to large fluctuations in investment. This played out strongly in the 
evolution of the 2008 crisis where, by 2010, large firms seemed to be sitting on a couple 
of trillion dollars of cash, while SMEs remained credit constrained.
At the centre of  the modern theory of  credit rationing, as observed at the macro 
level, are banks—a critical institution which was missing from DSGE models. 
This was a particularly peculiar omission because, without banks, there presum-
ably would be no central banks, and it is the central bank’s conduct of  monetary 
policy that is central in those models. The fact that credit is allocated by institutions 
37 One implication of equity-constrained firms is that firms will act in a risk-averse manner—behaviour 
which is markedly different from that assumed in the standard DSGE models. See Greenwald and Stiglitz 
(1990a,b, 2003). An important implication of Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993b) is that aggregate behaviour is 
not just a function of averages, e.g. a shock that increases the balance sheets of some firms (oil exporters) 
but decreases that of other firms (oil importers) in the same amount will have an adverse effect on aggregate 
demand and supply. Empirically, it should be possible to incorporate this effect, at least partially.
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(banks), rather than through conventional markets (auctions) is an important dis-
tinction lost in the DSGE framework. Greenwald and Stiglitz (2003) model banks 
as firms, which take others’ capital, in combination with their own, obtaining and 
processing information, making decisions about which loans to make. They too are 
by and large equity constrained, but in addition face a large number of  regulatory 
constraints. Shocks to their balance sheets, changes in the available set of  loans and 
their expectations about returns, and alterations in regulations lead to large changes 
in loan supply and the terms at which loans are made available. Variations in regu-
lations and circumstances of  banks across states in the US are helping validate the 
importance of  variation in the supply conditions in banking in the 2008 crisis and 
its aftermath.38
Given how long it takes balance sheets to be restored when confronted with a shock 
of  the size of  that of  2008, it is not surprising that the effects persisted.39 But they 
seem to have persisted even after the restoration of  bank and firm balance sheets. 
That suggests that this crisis (like the Great Depression) is more than a balance sheet 
crisis. It is part of  a structural transformation, in the advanced countries, the most 
notable aspects of  which are a shift from manufacturing to a service-sector economy 
and an outsourcing of  unskilled production to emerging markets; for developing 
countries, the structural transformation involves industrialization and globalization. 
Not surprisingly, such structural transformations have large macroeconomic conse-
quences and are an essential part of  growth processes. DSGE models are particu-
larly unsuited to address their implications for several reasons: (a) the assumption 
of  rational expectations, and even more importantly, common knowledge, might be 
relevant in the context of  understanding fluctuations and growth in an agricultural 
environment with well-defined weather shocks described by a stationary distribu-
tion,40 but it cannot describe changes, like these, that happen rarely;41 (b) studying 
these changes requires at least a two-sector model; and (c) a key market failure is the 
free mobility of  resources, especially labour, across sectors. Again, simple models 
have been constructed investigating how structural transformation can lead to a per-
sistent high level of  unemployment, and how, even then, standard Keynesian policies 
can restore full employment, but by contrast, increasing wage flexibility can increase 
unemployment (see Delli Gatti et al., 2012a,b).
38 Hamid Rashid in some recent unpublished analyses has been able to demonstrate this.
39 Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) emphasize that financial crises tend to be long and persistent. But when 
the economy experiences a deep real shock, it is inevitable that eventually there will be consequences for the 
financial sector, including banking. The stock market crash of 1929 didn’t turn into a full-scale banking 
crisis until several years later. Italy’s current banking crisis is the result of  its prolonged stagnation. If  finan-
cial crises are largely the result of deep and prolonged real shocks, then the statement that economic crises 
associated with financial crises are long lasting says nothing more than that deep and prolonged crises are 
deep and prolonged.
40 With global warming, even the assumption that variations in weather are described by a stationary 
distribution is clearly not correct.
41 Knight (1921) distinguished between risk and uncertainty. The standard model with rational expecta-
tions models risk. Here, there is fundamental uncertainty.
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(iv) Adjustment and equilibrium
One of the reasons that downturns with high levels of unemployment persist relates to 
the process of adjustment.42 DSGE models don’t address that issue: they simply assume 
that the economy jumps to the new equilibrium path.43 Though in a model with a single 
individual, solving for the value of current values of wages and prices which ensures 
that the transversality condition is satisfied is conceptually clear (the super-smart indi-
vidual simply thinks through the consequences of choosing any other set of current 
wages and prices), it is not apparent how that is to be done in the context of a world 
without common knowledge. If  there were a full set of markets extending infinitely far 
into the future, the problem I described would not occur. But there are not—this is one 
of the key market failures.44 That the consequences could be ‘resolved’ by the existence 
of a representative agent provides no insight into how the absence of these markets is 
addressed in the actual world. Indeed, this problem arises even if  the only difference 
among individuals is their date of birth; with overlapping generations, and at least some 
individuals not behaving as if  there is a dynastic utility function extending over infinity, 
not only can there exist sunspot equilibrium (Cass and Shell, 1983), but there can be an 
infinity of paths consistent with rational expectations (see Hirano and Stiglitz, 2017).
Indeed, there is a disparity between an analysis based on the assumption of instant-
aneous adjustment to a new equilibrium, and what actually happens—and what most 
policy economists assume. There is a decentralized process of wage and price adjust-
ment, with wages and prices in each market responding to the tightness in that market 
(in the labour market, that is the simple Phillips curve, asserting that wages rise when 
labour markets become tight). Obviously, adjustment processes may be more com-
plicated in a macroeconomic environment with inflation, where nominal adjustment 
would be expected to take into account inflationary expectations.
In the short run, such adjustment processes may be disequilibrating: the fall in wages 
as a result of unemployment may result in a decrease in aggregate demand, increasing 
the level of unemployment. This is especially true (an implicit assumption in Keynes; an 
explicit assumption in Kaldor (1957) and Pasinetti (1962)) if  the marginal propensity 
42 As we have noted, empirical DSGE models have introduced a large number of factors to smooth out 
behaviour, e.g. costs of adjustment in investment and habit formation in consumption. Many of these pro-
long booms, but some should have the effect of shortening the downturn.
43 If, of course, there are costs of adjustment, the size of the jump may be affected by the structure and 
magnitude of those costs. My critique here parallels that of Hendry and Muellbauer (2018, this issue) who 
noted ‘the notion that the economy follows a stable long-run trend is highly questionable, despite heroic 
attempts by policy-makers to stabilize the path’. My critique goes further: DSGE models assume that even 
without government intervention, the economy is on the (unique) convergent path. Hendry and Muellbauer 
go on to argue that ‘The world is usually in disequilibrium: economies are wide-sense non-stationary from 
evolution and sudden, often unanticipated, shifts both affecting key variables directly and many more in-
directly.  .  .  . The assumption made in the business-cycle accounting framework that the economy is never 
very far from its steady-state trend was simply wrong. These models were unable to capture the possibility of  
the kind of financial accelerator that operated in the US sub-prime crisis and the resulting financial crisis. 
They ignored the shock amplifying, propagating, and potentially destabilizing processes in the financial 
accelerator.’
44 Discussed long ago by Hahn (1966). See also Shell and Stiglitz (1967).
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to consume (MPC) differs across groups; the lowering of wages shifts income towards 
profits, and capitalists’ MPC is lower than that of workers.
What matters is, of course, real wages, and that depends on the adjustment of wages 
relative to prices (see Solow and Stiglitz, 1968). Wages and prices may both be falling, 
at the same rate, resulting in real wages being constant, a kind of real wage rigidity. The 
increase in real balances (real value of money holdings) would normally be expected 
to increase spending, but this effect is relatively small, so that the unemployment equi-
librium could still persist for a long time. Moreover, the deflation itself  has a depress-
ing effect, since it increases the real interest rate (holding everything else constant). In 
addition, if, as assumed in the previous paragraph, different groups in the economy 
have different MPCs, the (unexpected) deflation45 redistributes income from debtors 
to creditors, and this depresses aggregate consumption even more (see Eggertsson and 
Krugman (2012) and Korinek and Simsek (2016)). (Even more so, in an open economy, 
where the creditor is abroad: it is akin to a transfer of income to foreigners, with espe-
cially great effect then on demand for non-traded goods.)46 Similarly, adjustments of 
prices have balance sheet effects of the kind already discussed, with large macroeco-
nomic consequences.
(v) Financial frictions
Not surprisingly, in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis there is a growing con-
sensus that at least one critical failing of the standard model is its (non-)treatment of 
the financial sector.47 Financial frictions, as they have come to be called, are impor-
tant. These include credit and equity rationing and the corollary importance of col-
lateral constraints and of banks, to all of which I have already referred. There are, of 
course, a variety of information and enforcement problems that can give rise to finan-
cial frictions. Those that might provide the simplest textbook treatment—showing their 
potential importance—may not be the most important. This may matter, because dif-
ferent financial frictions may differ in their policy consequences. In particular, theories 
based on costly enforcement (e.g. Eaton and Gersovitz, 1981) or costly state verification 
(Townsend, 1979) differ markedly from those based on adverse selection and incen-
tives, noted earlier. Similarly, though important macroeconomic externalities may arise 
in any of these models (e.g. with incentive compatibility, self-selection, or collateral 
constraints), and, typically, the latter are easiest to analyse, that is partly because the 
constraint is not adequately endogenized.48
Still, for purposes of a simple benchmark model, it may be far better to incorporate 
some financial frictions than to ignore them altogether. Indeed, the core teaching model 
for macroeconomics that I use entails a three-period model. The centre of attention is 
45 That is, not incorporated into an adjustment in the interest rate charged. This particular effect would 
not arise if  debt contracts were fully indexed, but arises whenever there is unexpected disinflation.
46 There can also be balance sheet effects (the financial accelerator), as described earlier.
47 See Vines and Wills (2018, this issue).
48 That is, plausibly, the constraint may change with changes in policy and should be endogenously 
derived (see Stiglitz and Weiss, 1986). In the short run, that often does not appear to be the case, so that the 
standard approach may not be unreasonable for the development of benchmark models.
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today, but this is linked to the past (decisions and shocks in the past affect current state 
variables) and the future. Valuation functions summarize the future beyond tomor-
row, and individuals, firms, and banks today may engage in intertemporal trade-offs. 
Aggregate demand is based on reduced form functions for aggregate consumption and 
aggregate investment, in which credit constraints and net worth play an important role. 
Firm production and investment decisions are motivated by value-maximizing firms 
facing equity constraints (in the short run, they can’t raise equity), and a rising cost of 
borrowing as they borrow more (reflecting a higher leverage and an increasing expected 
value of bankruptcy),49 with a standard production function. The minimal model 
incorporating distribution entails two classes of households, workers who consume 
their income and capitalists who maximize their intertemporal utility function within 
their borrowing constraints. The central bank sets the T-bill rate, and the loan curve is 
a function of that rate, bank net worth, regulations, and the state of the economy. An 
adverse shock shifts the loan curve up (i.e. at any level of borrowing, the representative 
firm has to pay a higher interest rate). The model can then be expanded, depending 
on the question being posed. For a more extended description of the model, see the 
Appendix.
IV. Policy
One of the main reasons we want a good benchmark model is for policy. As we have 
already noted, short-run forecasting models, even when they conceptually begin 
within a DSGE framework, add in a variety of variables to increase forecasting accu-
racy. Having a model which matches moments says little about forecasting accuracy. 
Especially when there is a deep downturn, governments want to do something. Models 
constructed for analysing small fluctuations are likely to provide little guidance.
Governments make decisions about specific expenditures, and there is no reason to 
believe expenditure multipliers associated with public investment that is complemen-
tary to private investment will be the same, e.g. as for public consumption expenditures. 
The former crowds in private investment. But DSGE models are unlikely to be able to 
handle this kind of subtlety, which is at the core of public policy discourse.
Conventional wisdom, partly based on the standard model, is that over time public 
deficits designed to stimulate the economy lead to public debt, which can crowd out 
private capital accumulation, harming growth. But that depends on a host of assump-
tions: (a) if  the public expenditure goes to public capital goods or human capital or 
technology which are complementary to private capital goods, it can crowd in private 
capital accumulation; (b) in an economy at a zero lower bound, the government can 
just print money to finance the expenditures. At such times, one is often worried about 
deflation; any inflationary effects of such money-printing are thus beneficial.
So too, the conventional insight that with rational expectations, multipliers will 
be low (zero) because of the expectation of future tax increases depends on special 
assumptions: (a) if  the expenditures are for productivity-enhancing public investments, 
49 The limiting case of which is credit rationing—households or firms can’t borrow beyond a certain 
amount.
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the conventional multiplier is actually increased with rational expectations; (b) so too, if  
there had been the expectation of a prolonged economic downturn; some of the ‘leak-
ages’ from spending today are reflected in spending in future demand-constrained peri-
ods, increasing incomes in those periods; consumers, taking this into account, spend 
more today than they otherwise would have spent.50
With financial frictions, monetary policy may be relatively ineffective, not because of 
the zero lower bound (if  that were really the problem, changes in investment tax credits 
and consumption taxes over time could have altered individuals’ marginal rates of sub-
stitution), but because lowering the T-bill rate (or the Fed discount rate) may not alter 
bank lending much. If  that is the case, policies aimed more directly at increasing credit 
availability to those borrowers for whom it is constrained may prove more effective than 
conventional monetary policy.51
The central point is that there is a wide range of policies with significant macro-
economic effects that governments consider, and we have to be able to tailor-make 
models—building off  the core model described earlier—to ascertain the effects. Many 
policies, for instance, may affect a country’s exposure to shocks (full capital market lib-
eralization); others may affect the strength of a country’s automatic stabilizers. Having 
a simple model that can analyse these effects is crucial. Building such a model from 
a DSGE framework is unlikely to be as helpful as building one from the framework 
described above.52
The economy today is going through a structural transformation. The result may be 
that with current levels and forms of government expenditure and taxation and private 
expenditures, the economy might fall short of full employment. For all the reasons dis-
cussed above and others, the adjustment to a full employment equilibrium may be slow. 
But even with sticky wages and prices, there exists a set of fiscal policy interventions 
over time (taxes, expenditures) which could bring the economy back to full employment 
in the short run, or at least bring it back to full employment faster than would other-
wise be the case: not just one, but a multiplicity of such paths, differing, for instance, 
in their levels of public investment and growth in the short run. Even if  one were con-
cerned about the level of debt, there is a balanced budget multiplier—and if  the taxes 
and expenditures are chosen carefully, that multiplier can be quite large. Thus, ‘secular 
stagnation’ associated with persistent unemployment is not a disease that happens to 
a country: it is a consequence of policies that can be changed. Again, as we noted 
50 See Neary and Stiglitz (1983). So, too, the standard result on the inefficacy of debt-financed expendi-
tures does not hold if  there are binding credit constraints and/or if  there are life-cycle savers, who are uncon-
cerned about tax payments beyond their horizon.
51 These remarks may provide insight into the relative ineffectiveness of even the so-called non-conven-
tional policies in bringing the economy back to full employment. Without paying due attention to effects on 
banks’ balance sheets, negative interest rates could even lead to reduce lending activity. We have already noted 
how these ideas did play a role in the response to the 1991–2 recession by the Clinton administration. So, too, 
behavioural economics played an important role in the design of the tax cut in the Obama administration.
52 As we have noted, DSGE models begin with the competitive equilibrium model. Variations in that 
model focused on open economies therefore include an equation assuming uncovered interest parity (UIP). 
As Hendry and Muellbauer (2018, this issue) point out: ‘There is strong empirical evidence against UIP. 
Evidence tends to suggest that for small deviations from long-run equilibrium in which purchasing power 
parity plays an important role, the exchange rate is not far from a random walk, but for large deviations, 
equilibrium correction is important.’
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earlier, building from a DSGE model, with its assumptions of common knowledge and 
rational expectations, is not likely to be as helpful in designing policies responding to 
the structural transformation as beginning with a model focusing on financial frictions, 
as described earlier.53
V. Further critiques
One could go through each of the underlying assumptions of the DSGE model, to 
explain the role they play—and why they result in a model that fails to predict and 
explain important aspects of macroeconomic fluctuations, and why ‘reforms’ which 
are supposed to improve economic efficiency may actually increase macroeconomic 
volatility.
(i) On the importance of differences in beliefs
I have, for instance, alluded to the assumption of rational expectations. I  strongly 
believe that one cannot fully explain the growth of the housing bubble that played such 
a large role in the recent crisis within a rational expectations framework.54 But clearly, 
some of the ‘reforms’ in mortgage markets (strongly supported by the Fed Chair at the 
time) contributed to the creation of the bubble.
Differences in beliefs, too, can play an important role in macroeconomic fluctuations, 
through what Guzman and Stiglitz call the creation and destruction of pseudo-wealth. 
When two individuals differ in beliefs, they have an incentive to engage in a bet (or eco-
nomic transactions which are similar to bets). Both sides, of course, think that they are 
going to win, so that the sum of their ‘perceived’ wealth is greater than ‘true’ wealth. 
Until the bet gets resolved, there is an incentive for both to spend more than they oth-
erwise would, if  necessary going into debt. The resolution of the bet (the occurrence of 
the event) means that one side becomes wealthier, the other side less wealthy; but there 
is more than just a transfer of income: there is a destruction in aggregate wealth leading 
to a decrease in aggregate consumption. Pseudo-wealth is being created and destroyed 
all the time, but certain changes—like the creation of new betting markets, e.g. associ-
ated with ‘improvements’ in finance, associated with the creation of markets in deriv-
atives and CDSs—can lead to significant increases in aggregate pseudo-wealth; and 
certain events, like the collapse of the housing bubble, can lead to its net destruction. 
Fluctuations in pseudo-wealth help explain one of the paradoxes of macroeconomics: 
53 In such structural transformation, differences in views are likely to be large, giving rise to the possi-
bility of an increase in pseudo-wealth, as described in the next section, and subsequent volatility. Financial 
structural reform, allowing for more betting, will increase this volatility, and this should have been taken into 
account in evaluating the benefits. Again, our critique of the use of rational expectations in such situations 
parallels that of Hendry and Muellbauer (2018), who note: ‘Shifts in the credit market architecture are only 
one example of structural breaks and evolutions, implying that the notion that the economy follows a stable 
long-run trend is highly questionable. . . . Uncertainty then becomes radical. Structural breaks also make it 
hard to sustain the possibility of “rational” or model consistent expectations.’
54 See Shiller (2007) and Stiglitz (2010b).
Where modern macroeconomics went wrong 87
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/oxrep/article-abstract/34/1-2/70/4781816
by Milbank Memorial Library user
on 20 June 2018
the large fluctuations in the economy in spite of small changes in the physical state vari-
ables, the stock of capital, labour, and natural capital.55,56
(ii) Aggregation
One set of assumptions that is critical, and to which too little attention is given in mac-
roeconomic analyses, concerns aggregation.
 Long ago we learned the difficulties of constructing an aggregate production func-
tion.57 The ‘putty-putty’ model provides great simplification, but one should not claim 
that any analysis based on it is really ‘microfounded’. While earlier analyses provided 
a critique of the use of the standard model for equilibrium analysis, e.g. when there is 
production of commodities by means of commodities or when there are production 
processes involving capital goods of markedly different durability;58 the use is even 
more questionable for analyses of dynamics: the dynamics of putty-clay models and 
vintage capital models, for instance, are markedly different from those of putty-putty 
models.59 It would thus be foolhardy to rely on the putty-clay model for any analysis 
of dynamics in the short to medium term when such vintage effects can be important.
Even more important is perhaps the aggregation of the whole economy into a sin-
gle sector, particularly when the underlying stress on the economy is one of structural 
change, requiring the movement of resources from one sector to another (say agricul-
ture to manufacturing), when there are market imperfections (say in access to credit) 
impeding the reallocation.60
Policy analyses are also likely to be misguided. Monetary policy is typically presented 
as an efficient tool. But monetary policy has disproportionate effects on interest-sen-
sitive sectors, thus inducing a distortion in the economy that simply is not evident in a 
one-sector model (see Kreamer, 2015).
Finally, the use of a representative agent represents an aggregation of the household 
sector. It is understandable that macroeconomists attempting to microfound macro-
theory would want to impose some restrictions: otherwise, any set of demand functions 
55 There is ample evidence that individuals differ in their beliefs. Note these theories are consistent with 
each individual believing that he has rational expectations—he is forming his expectations on the basis of all 
information available to him. But they are not consistent with common knowledge, where everyone has the 
same beliefs. There can also be ‘negative’ pseudo-wealth, where what individuals believe they are going to pay 
to creditors is greater than the creditor believes he receives. See Guzman and Stiglitz (2016a,b).
56 There are, of course, other possible explanations for this, e.g. sunspot theories, where there may be 
multiple equilibria. In this short note, I cannot explain the relative strengths of these alternative explanations.
57 See Fisher (1969).
58 That is, the relationship between the value of capital (per capita) and output (per capita) may be far 
different than suggested by the standard production function. For a review, see Stiglitz (1974).
59 For instance, if, during a period of low interest rates, firms install very capital-intensive machines 
(with a high output per worker), it will be more difficult for the economy to return to full employment: the 
necessary increase in aggregate demand will have to be greater than it otherwise would have been. See Morin 
(2014), Cass and Stiglitz (1969). For a more popular discussion, see Aeppel (2012).
60 Emphasized in the work of Delli Gatti et al. noted earlier.
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could be claimed to be microfounded.61 But assuming a representative agent goes too 
far, because it eliminates any possibility that distribution matters. There is at least a 
significant body of thought that argues that the increase in inequality played some, and 
possibly a critical role, in the build-up to the crisis and to the slow recovery; there are 
large differences in the marginal propensity to consume between the top 1 per cent and 
the bottom 80 per cent and, accordingly, anything that affects distribution significantly 
affects aggregate demand, i.e. has macroeconomic consequences.62
VI. Going still further beyond the standard model
The microeconomics of the basic competitive model—as formulated in Arrow and 
Debreu—has been shown to be flawed by 40 years of economic research. Why should 
we expect a macroeconomic model based on such microfoundations to work? Most 
deeply, the standard model is intellectually incoherent and implicitly encourages soci-
ety to move in a direction which would undermine both efficiency and well-being. It 
assumes that all individuals are purely selfish and yet that contracts are always fully 
honoured. Individuals who are fully selfish know that there are enforcement costs, and 
will not honour their contracts fully, even if  the consequence is a loss in reputation. 
Thus, the Department of Justice and a number of private suits have uncovered the role 
of pervasive fraud in the securitization process, by many if  not most of the credit rating 
agencies, mortgage originators, and investment banks, consistent with Kindleberger’s 
(1978) analysis of earlier depressions and panics.63 While incorporating such behaviour 
in a standard economic model is difficult,64 the prevalence of such behaviour is surely 
out of the spirit of standard DSGE models and more consistent with those models 
emphasizing institutional arrangements to prevent such behaviour and the exploitation 
of imperfections of information. Surely, both policies to prevent a recurrence of simi-
lar crises and analyses of market dynamics will need to take into account both market 
and regulatory responses. Most importantly, the inculcation and normalization of a 
culture of selfishness without moral bounds will lead to an economy that is less efficient 
with lower individual and societal well-being. Behavioural economics has noted that 
most individuals systematically behave differently from that model but that embedding 
61 That is, according to the Mantel–Sonnenschein theorem, in the absence of some restriction, such as 
the ‘representative agent’ assumption (where all individuals are assumed identical), virtually any aggregate 
function can be consistent with the standard competitive model. See Mantel (1974), Sonnenschein (1972), 
and Kirman (1992). There is also a large literature describing the very restrictive conditions under which such 
household aggregation can be done.
62 Thus, the critique is far more than that the conditions allowing for such aggregation are not satisfied. 
That is obviously the case, and the fact that it is raises, too, questions about claims that DSGE models are 
well microfounded.
63 Interestingly, there were provisions of standard contracts in the securitization process designed to 
mitigate the consequences of moral hazard, but these provisions failed to work as intended, both because of 
widespread fraud and breach of contract.
64 Though there have been some attempts to incorporate them and their implications into simple micro-
economic models, these have not yet been fully brought into macroeconomic analysis. One important variant 
of the strand of standard macroeconomics does incorporate insights from one particular variant of financial 
frictions centring on costly state verification.
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individuals within a culture of selfishness (where that is taken as the norm) leads to 
changes in behaviour in that direction.65 Macroeconomics is supposed to provide us 
with models of how the economy actually behaves, rather than how it might behave 
in a mythical world of infinitely selfish people but among whom contracts are always 
honoured. Adam Smith, often described as the father of modern ‘selfish’ economics, in 
his invisible hand conjecture,66 reminds us in his Theory of Moral Sentiments (Smith, 
1759):
How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles 
in his nature which interest him in the fortunes of others, and render their hap-
piness important to him, though he derives nothing from it except the pleasure 
of seeing it.
The earlier Smith was fortunately right, and modern macroeconomics should strive to 
incorporate behaviour which is consistent with these impulses, just as it does behav-
iour that is consistent with impulses that may be less noble.67 One of the critiques of 
DSGE modelling is that it and its underlying assumptions have become a dogma, 
with little incentive to call them into question, especially in a context of peer-reviewed 
publications.
VII. Concluding comments
Assumptions matter. All models make simplifications. The question is, as we have said, 
what simplifications are appropriate for asking what questions. The danger is that the 
simplifications bias the answers, sometimes in ways that we are not aware of. The DSGE 
model ignored issues that turned out to be key in the 2008 crisis; not surprisingly, the 
model neither predicted the most important macroeconomic event in the past three-
quarters of a century nor provided good guidance as to the appropriate policy responses. 
Given the way the models are structured, they could not have predicted such an event. 
In the run-up to the crisis, monetary authorities focused on inflation rather than on 
what they should have been focusing on—financial stability; and some of their (espe-
cially deregulatory) actions clearly contributed to financial instability. The DSGE mod-
els provided them (false) assurance that they were doing the right thing.
Of course, any good macroeconomic model has to be dynamic and stochastic, and 
present an analysis of the entire economy. But specific assumptions, as we have noted, 
went into each of these components. We have already discussed several aspects of the 
assumed dynamics.
65 For a discussion of some of the recent empirical evidence, see Hoff and Stiglitz (2016).
66 A conjecture, which we noted, turned out to be false whenever there were imperfect risk markets and 
asymmetric information, except in the very special conditions underlying real business cycle theory and its 
descendants.
67 For an excellent discussion of these two contrasting views of human nature and their implications for 
economics, see Vines and Morris (2015). For an attempt to incorporate some aspects of these considerations 
into a formal model, see Greenwald and Stiglitz (1992).
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Some of the greatest deficiencies, I believe, relate to the treatment of uncertainty, the 
stochastic element in DSGE models. We have already questioned the underlying pre-
sumption in the model of how risks get dissipated through diversification, and that the 
underlying shocks are exogenous. Also questionable are the typically unstated assump-
tions concerning risk management. There is ample evidence that risk has first-order 
effects on firms, households, and banks that are not adequately incorporated into the 
standard DSGE models. That is why those models had nothing to say about one of the 
critical questions confronting policy-makers in the 2008 crisis: how best to recapital-
ize banks. The objective was to enhance lending, especially to SMEs. The way chosen 
by the US and some other countries, entailing the issuance of preferred shares, can be 
shown to be far from optimal. There were other ways of bank recapitalization which 
would have led risk-averse banks to lend more.
In this paper, we have provided many examples of insights that are revealed by simple 
macroeconomic models with finite periods—insights that are typically obfuscated by 
the simplifications required by DSGE modelling.
To me, small and big models should be viewed as complementary: one needs to use 
each to check the results of the other. Perhaps there is some effect that got lost in the 
three-period simplification. More often than not, it goes the other way. But it is not 
really a question of small vs big. It is a matter of the careful choice of assumptions. As 
I have noted, sectoral aggregation is problematic when the underlying macro-distur-
bance is that of structural change.
That having been said, our models do affect how we think: DSGE models encour-
age us to think in terms of the economy always moving along a dynamic equilibrium 
path, and focus our attention on intertemporal substitution. Neither, I suspect, is at the 
heart of what is really going on in the short to medium term; and as I have suggested, 
the DSGE has little to say concerning long-term growth. For instance, the belief  in the 
effectiveness of monetary policy has led to the conclusion that its current obvious inef-
fectiveness is only because of the zero lower bound: if  only we could break through that 
bound the economy could be restored to full employment.68 Of course, if  there were a 
large enough negative interest rate—if people never had to pay back their loans—there 
is little doubt that the economy could be stimulated. The question, though, is whether 
moderate changes, from a real interest rate of say –2 per cent to –4 per cent, would have 
done the trick, when much larger changes have proven ineffective. The reason for the 
ineffectiveness lies partly in the fact that lowering the nominal interest rate on T-bills 
may not lead to a lower lending rate or that lowering the T-bill rate may not lead to an 
increase in credit availability, as we have already noted. But, as we have also noted, if  
one really thought that intertemporal prices were the crucial consideration, one could 
have changed those through tax policies, through changing consumption tax rates and 
investment tax credits over time.
In the end, all models, no matter how theoretical, are tested in one way or the other, 
against observations. Their components—like the consumption behaviour—are tested 
68 This belief  encouraged some central banks to move towards negative interest rates, with little suc-
cess in restoring the economies to robust growth. In some cases, the effects seem negative. Japan’s Central 
Bank was particularly sensitive to the issues raised here (issues, as we have noted, that were not central in the 
DSGE models): they worked to mitigate any adverse bank balance sheet effects while maintaining substitu-
tion effects.
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with a variety of micro- and macro-data. But deep downturns, like the 2008 crisis, occur 
sufficiently rarely that we cannot use the usual econometric techniques for assessing 
how well our model does in explaining/predicting these events—the things we really 
care about. That’s why, as I have suggested, simply using a least-squares fit won’t do. 
One needs a Bayesian approach—with heavier weight associated with predictions when 
we care about the answer. Comparing certain co-variances in calibrated models is even 
less helpful. There are so many assumptions and so many parameters you can choose 
for your model, many more than the number of moments you can get from the data; 
so being able to match all moments in the data does not tell you that your assump-
tions were correct, and thus does not provide much confidence that forecasts or policies 
based on that model will be accurate.
Defenders of DSGE models counter that other models did little better than the 
DSGE models. That is not correct. There were several economists (such as Rob Shiller) 
who, using less fully articulated models, could see that there was clear evidence of a high 
probability of a housing bubble. There were models of financial contagion (described 
earlier in this paper, developed further since the crisis), which predicted that the col-
lapse of the housing bubble would likely have systemic effects. The conviction that this 
would happen would have been even stronger had the data that the Fed had available 
to it before the crisis also been available to the public. Policy-makers using alternative 
models of the kind described here would have done far better both in anticipating the 
crisis and coping with it than those relying on DSGE models.
Models have consequences even when their predictions and explanatory power are 
less than stellar. For they affect how households, firms, and, most importantly, policy-
makers think about the economy. Models which say that the fundamental market fail-
ure arises from wage rigidities may be induced to argue for more wage flexibility—to 
argue that if  only we could achieve that, economic performance would be improved.
This essay has argued that the standard DSGE model provides a poor basis for pol-
icy, and tweaks to it are unlikely to be helpful. Fortunately, there are alternative frame-
works to which modern policy-makers can turn. I have tried here to describe some of 
the core elements that need to be incorporated into the benchmark models with which 
we teach macroeconomics to our students. The challenge we should be posing to them 
is how to develop increasingly sophisticated versions of these into models, small and 
large, incorporating the various insights provided by a range of ‘partial’ models (such 
as that of the banking sector) that help us understand the important fluctuations in our 
economy, and what more we might do to reduce their magnitude and frequency and the 
human suffering that so often results.
Appendix: Core models for macroeconomic policy
The core models for macro-policy today focus on equilibrium today, and incorporate, 
in reduced form, insights from recent advances in micro- and macroeconomics, tak-
ing on specialized form to focus on one issue or another, one set of circumstances or 
another. Here, we focus only on closed economy models and on the effect of various 
policies on output and employment.
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(i) Constructing a barebones model
The barebones model begins with a neo-Walrasian model, attempting to incorporate 
the insights of modern microeconomics into the basic aggregate equations, which are 
not meant to represent the behaviour of a representative individual, but the aggregation 
of many individuals. Accordingly, a change in, say, a market variable will not only have 
income and substitution effects, but also distributive effects.
Basic structure
The full model has three periods. Most of the analysis focuses on the middle period, 
labelled period 1, and how policies in that period affect outcomes in that period, identi-
fying the interdependencies between those policies, and the household, firm, and finan-
cial sectors. Thus, the model is a general equilibrium model, but with a far richer set of 
interrelationships than characterizes the standard DSGE model. We outline variants in 
which wages and prices are fully flexible, completely fixed, and intermediate cases. But 
even when wages and prices are fully flexible, the market equilibrium may deviate sub-
stantially from the ‘perfect markets’ equilibrium because of imperfect capital markets, 
which lead firms to be risk averse and which result in banks playing a central role. Thus, 
knowing capital and labour supply in this period does not suffice to determine output 
and employment.
Each period is linked both to the past and the future, and the other two periods 
(‘zero’ and ‘two’) capture these linkages. What matters is not just firms’ capital stock 
but also indebtedness (financial structure) and banks’ and households’ balance sheets. 
Thus, we show how shocks at time zero affect these state variables at time 1.
The objective of bringing in period 2 is to more formally analyse households’, 
banks’, and corporations’ intertemporal decision-making, e.g. as individuals weigh the 
marginal utility of consuming today vs the value of a dollar in the future. It enables 
us to isolate, for instance, the effect of an increase in future productivity on consump-
tion today. This intertemporal problem—in particular, the relevant Euler equations—is 
really at the centre of attention in DSGE models. The barebones model can be used to 
study these issues, but as we have suggested in the text, it is almost surely wrong to put 
them at the centre of macro-analysis.
Methodological remarks
The point of the barebones model is to help us understand better how changes in the 
environment (in an agricultural economy, say, bad weather yesterday or today) or pol-
icy affect outcomes, and the channels through which the effects are felt. While one 
could simultaneously incorporate multiple deviations from the standard competitive 
model, this is not typically the most insightful way to proceed. Rather, one wants to 
isolate, say, distribution effects, from balance sheet effects, from the effects of capital 
constraints, from the regulatory constraints facing banks. We begin by presenting a 
general model, incorporating many, if  not most, of the effects discussed in the text (and 
a few that we touched on only briefly). The real analysis, though, entails specializing 
this general model.
Underlying the analysis are judgments about the relative importance of different 
‘effects’, with some effects being sufficiently small to be ignored—labour supply in the 
barebones models is assumed inelastic at L*; but it is easy to elaborate on the model 
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to incorporate wage effects on labour supply, or even interest rate effects (though that 
is far-fetched). A key aspect of the analysis is testing for robustness: do results change 
significantly if, for instance, there is a positive but small labour supply elasticity?
The analysis begins by postulating that the aggregate demand for goods today, Yd, 
equals the aggregate supply of goods, Ys, and the aggregate demand for labour, N, 
equals the aggregate supply of labour, L. It then goes on to focus on key cases con-
sidered in the standard literature: for instance, wage and/or price rigidity; and a no-
shirking constraint in the labour market.
It focuses on policy, but not just on the effect of interest rates (which monetary pol-
icy is assumed to control), but also on regulatory policy, and on government expendi-
tures. But rather than beginning from the hypothesis that consumption and investment 
demands are separable from government expenditure, it recognizes that the form of 
government expenditure can affect either variable.
Policy analysis proceeds by first solving the general equilibrium problem in a reduced-
form one-period model—the endogenous variables (in particular output and employ-
ment) can be solved for as a function of all the policy variables, P (given all the other 
relevant variables describing the economy). It is then a straightforward matter to take 
the derivative of, say, output or employment with respect to any particular variable, 
say a particular type of government expenditure. While the resulting expressions are 
complex and will not be presented here, the analysis can be simplified by assuming that 
most of the effects are small relative to a few upon which attention is focused. A key 
difference between the model presented here and the standard DSGE models is that 
many of the variables that are of first order importance are omitted from that model. 
The model here, by contrast, pays much less attention to the intertemporal effects upon 
which the DSGE model focuses. Some of the reasons for this have already been given; 
others are noted in the final remarks of this Appendix.
The barebones model described below incorporates three effects missing from the 
standard DSGE models: (i) distribution, (ii) banks, and (iii) credit constraints. One has 
to pay attention to not just the values of average variables and their changes, but also 
to dispersion, and changes in dispersion. Knowing that, on average, household wealth 
was large, with home equity sufficiently great that default was not a significant risk, told 
one nothing about the state of the economy in 2008: large fractions of households were 
in fact not able to make their interest payments. Thus, in an important elaboration on 
the barebones model, dispersions in the relevant state variables (which need to be more 
formally modelled than here) have to be introduced.
But even in the barebones model, we recognize that the relevant variables are aggre-
gates among heterogeneous agents, and that distribution matters. Thus, a lowering of 
the interest rate might lower the income of retirees dependent on interest payments, and 
this distributional income effect may be much larger than any individual substitution 
effect—including any effect in stimulating investment, except through a collateral effect 
on credit-constrained firms.
(ii) Period 1
The key ingredients, aggregate demand and aggregate supply, are standard, but their 
determinants include variables typically left out of DSGE models.
Joseph E. Stiglitz94
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/oxrep/article-abstract/34/1-2/70/4781816
by Milbank Memorial Library user
on 20 June 2018
Aggregate demand
As in any standard model, we begin by describing aggregate demand69:
(1)
where in the obvious notation C = consumption, w = wage rate, p = price level, r = 
T-bill rate, rL  = (nominal) interest rate at which individuals can borrow (about which 
we will say more below), t = tax rate (assumed fixed), I = Investment, c = credit availa-
bility, G = government expenditures, and represents expectations of the relevant var-
iables (to be described below). G is a vector of government expenditures, e.g. investment 
expenditures that are complements (or substitutes) to private investment, consumption 
expenditures that are substitutes (or complements) to private consumption. Aggregate 
demand is the sum of consumption, investment, and government expenditures.
Consumption is affected by a variety of market variables, m ≡ {w, p, N, rL}, wages, 
prices, employment70 N and the borrowing rate rL ; a variety of policy variables P ≡ {r, 
t, G} set by the government, the interest rate71 r, the tax rate t, and (a vector of) govern-
ment expenditures G; credit constraints c, itself a function of market and policy variables; 
other variables ξh : an individual’s wealth, his liquidity, and his risk perceptions, and like 
c, these can be a function of both market and policy variables; and his expectations of 
those variables, .  For instance, if individuals own land, an increase in the interest rate, if  
it is expected to continue into the future, will lower the value of land.72 If households hold 
their wealth in stocks and bonds, consumption smoothing is easy; if, as in many countries, 
much of household wealth is in the form of housing, households may suffer from illiquid-
ity, so that even if they would like to smooth their consumption over time by dissaving, it 
may be difficult for them to do so (except possibly by worsening liquidity in future dates). 
Expectations are complex—especially in idiosyncratic environments (situations like the 
Great Depression and Great Recession which have not occurred before, at least in the 
context of an economy that is very similar to the current economy), and it is always dif-
ficult to ascertain whether one is in such an environment. Thus, in a deep downturn, like 
the Great Recession, it is hard even to know what one would mean by ‘rational expecta-
tions’. One might, for instance, reasonably assume that if individuals save, some of the 
savings will translate into consumption in a demand-constrained period, in which case, 
future wage incomes will increase, and that in turn will lead to higher future consumption 
today. In short, it is reasonable to think of expectations as being affected by current vari-
ables, but the magnitude (and in some cases even sign) of the effects will not always be 
Y C Id = ( ) + ( ) +N w p r r t G cL, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ξ h Gw r p G c f ξ f
69 For the moment, we drop time superscripts.
70 It is not assumed that individuals sell all of the labour they wish to. This is important.
71 Because some individuals may be lending (say holding government bonds) and others borrowing, both 
rates are relevant. The standard DSGE model doesn’t recognize the distinction, and the fact that the rate at 
which banks lend is an endogenous variable.
72 For instance, if  T is land holdings, q is the price of land, the value of individuals land wealth is qT. q 
itself  needs to be solved for as part of the general equilibrium, a function of all the policy and state variables.
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clear.73 All of this can be embraced within the general representation above. To the extent 
that there is a significant intertemporal substitution effect arising from changes in the real 
interest rate, one has to model the effect of the market and policy variables on inflation-
ary expectations. In highly reduced form, where expectations themselves are taken to be 
endogenous, we can write: C = C (m, P; ξh ).
Similarly, the investment function can be related to the usual variables (with Tobin’s 
q being a function of market and policy variables), with two additions: investment is 
affected by firm balance sheets74 (including liquidity) and may be credit constrained.75 
The credit constraint itself  can be thought of as being a function of the regulatory varia-
bles R as well as the behaviour of banks (or other lenders), itself  a function of market and 
policy variables as well as the net worth, liquidity, and expectations of banks {ξb, b}. 
More formally, in the absence of credit constraints and the expectation of future credit 
constraints, investment is given by I w r pL
d
f= ( , , , , , ) ,G  ξ f  and so long as the firm’s 
liquid assets L ≥ Id  – c, investment is given by Id . Hence, we can write: I = min { Id , L 
+ c}, where L itself  may be a function of market and policy variables.76 For simplicity, 
it is often useful to focus separately on the cases where the credit constraint is and is not 
binding. But this misses a key point: firm heterogeneity is important, and some firms 
may be credit constrained, others not.77
Aggregate supply
Aggregate supply is a function of the same state, market, and policy variables, though 
it is natural to assume that firms’ supply depends on wages relative to prices. The inter-
est rate may be important because it affects the cost of working capital. Again, balance 
sheets, risk perceptions, liquidity, and expectations of all the relevant variables matter 
(unlike in the standard neoclassical model). Thus, Y Y
w
p




, , , ξ
Finance
rL, the rate at which the firm borrows, depends on the T-bill rate, but there is an endog-
enously determined spread, affected by the state, environmental, and policy variables 
affecting banks and their expectations:
73 As an example of a complexity which is typically ignored, a lower interest rate today that leads to 
higher income today with more savings implies that (everything else being constant) wages in the future 
will be higher. In a standard putty-clay model, this means that firms will choose a more capital-intensive 
technology, implying that the increased level of investment is higher than we might have expected using a 
putty-putty model. Standard DSGE models simplify by assuming fully malleable capital. There are marked 
differences in dynamics (Cass and Stiglitz, 1969). While there is some ex post capital labour substitutability, 
clearly ex post substitutability is much less than ex ante substitutability. I have not seen a convincing argument 
that the economy behaves more like putty-putty than putty-clay.
74 As in Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993b).
75 As in Stiglitz and Weiss (1981).
76 Thus, if  there were a liquid land market, the value of land (a function of its market price q) is an en-
dogenous variable.
77 Thus, in the special cases of this general model focusing on this constraint, we begin with two classes 
of firms, one liquidity constrained, the other not. But even this misses the more general point: the fraction of 
firms that are liquidity constrained is an endogenous variable. By assuming a continuum of firms (with differ-
ent balance sheets) we can endogenously solve for the fraction of firms that are constrained.
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 r B rL = ( , , , )R bb ξ  (2)
In particular, banks are a particular kind of firm which takes its capital, borrows addi-
tional funds, and with these resources makes, monitors, and enforces loans, with the 
difference between the lending rate rL and the rate at which it can get access to funds 
(here assumed to be r) generating profits; it will charge a lower lending rate if  it thinks 
that there is less risk, if  its balance sheets are in better condition, if  reserve requirements 
or capital adequacy requirements are lower, etc.
Period 1 equilibrium with full flexibility
Thus, with full flexibility of wages and prices:
(3)
where Y is actual output. (2) can be substituted into (1) and (3) to obtain aggregate 
demand and supply as functions of the T-bill rate r—but now the financial position of 
banks, their ability and willingness to make loans, matters too.
With the capital stock fixed, the demand for labour depends on output, Y, and in 
equilibrium, this equals the supply, which is assumed fixed:78
 
N Y   L  L( ) = = *.  (4)
Full employment output is determined by (4), and then, for any given set of policy vari-
ables, P, expectation (functions) and other (state) variables ξ , the level of real wages, 
w/p, must be such as to ensure that Y* = Ys (note that Ys depends just on w/p). But 
given w/p, with Y* = Yd, equation (1) determines nominal wages and prices. With fixed 
nominal debt, as wages and prices rise together, aggregate demand increases. The real 
indebtedness of debtors decreases, and the net worth of creditors decreases. If  the mar-
ginal propensity to consume (from an increase in wealth) of debtors is greater than that 
of creditors—which we assume—the increase in consumption by debtors more than 
offsets the decreased consumption of creditors.79
There can be output variability in this model only as a result of shocks to the produc-
tion function. But a slight extension, allowing the labour supply to be a function of, say, 
the real wage L=L(w/p) means that (2), (3), and (4) together solve for w/p, rL, and N; 
changes in state variables ξ  (both of banks and non-bank firms) affect the endogenous 










 =, , ,f ξf
78 Again, in the more general case, actual employment is the minimum of the amount of labour 
demanded and supplied. The barebones model only considers the case where the demand for labour is equal 
to or less than the supply.
79 In the representative agent model, these two effects cancel. There can be other effects, e.g. on expec-
tations. If  investors believe that the increased inflation is not matched by an increase in nominal interest 
rates going forward, then the expected real interest rate will be decreased, and this will stimulate investment. 
Similarly, an unexpected increase in the price level could lead to more uncertainty about the future, with 
ambiguous effects on consumption but probably adverse effects on investment (see Rothschild and Stiglitz 
(1972), Diamond and Stiglitz (1974)). If  differences in the marginal propensities to consume are large, and the 
increases in prices are modest, the consumption effect is likely to dominate. The barebones model provides a 
framework within which one can discuss (and model) the significance of these various effects.
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By assumption, there is no unemployment, but shifts in the aggregate supply curve 
(changes in, say, ξ  either of firms or banks) lead to changes in the employment level 
and output. Economic variability is not just about shocks to the production function. 
And now policy affects the equilibrium not just through standard Keynesian impacts 
on aggregate demand, but also through shifting the aggregate supply curve (through 
(2)). Monetary policy matters, but not just through r, but through regulatory variables, 
and operating both on demand and supply. What matters are not just intertemporal 
substitution effects (which may be weak), but impacts on net worth of firms and banks, 
and through credit constraints.
Specialized versions of the model focus on each of these, and on distribution effects.80 
A simple two-class model (workers with life-cycle saving, and capitalists with long-term 
saving) can easily bring out these first-order distributional effects.
In short, this barebones model can provide insights into the cyclical fluctuations 
which would occur even in the absence of nominal wage and price rigidities.
Rigid nominal wages and prices
When there is a (nominal or real) rigidity, demand may not equal supply and then it is 
the short side of the market that prevails:
 
Y Y Ys d= min{ , }.  (5)
With nominal wages and prices fixed at w^ ,  p^ ,  aggregate demand could either be greater 
or less than supply.
Assume it is less. Then from (5), Y=Y Yd =
^
,  and employment is then N( Y
^
). Thus, a 
temporary decrease in the interest rate could, as we noted, lower consumption, because 
the distributive effect exceeds the substitution effect. If  investment is credit constrained, 
and the value of, say, land used for collateral does not change (much) in response to 
an announced temporary change in interest rate (as one would expect), then invest-
ment would not change. A regulatory change that resulted in banks making more loans 
would relax the credit constraint, and be more effective in stimulating the economy and 
increasing employment.
Assume that there were some policies that could lower wages, without instantane-
ously lowering prices. In a demand-constrained economy, that would lower consump-
tion, even if  it would increase aggregate supply.81 The effects on investment would be 
ambiguous, since (a) it would make profitable older equipment that might not other-
wise have been used; (b) it induces the use of more labour-intensive technology, and 
thus, for every unit of future increased expected output, it induces less investment; but 
(c) it makes investment overall more profitable. If  the firm(s) are credit constrained, the 
effect on investment would be zero. In short, there is some presumption that aggregate 
demand and thus output and employment would be reduced. Even though wages are 
80 Indeed, much of the recent macro-literature outside of the DSGE/RBC tradition can be seen as doing 
precisely that.
81 In an open economy, to the extent that the lower wages led to lower prices, demand for exports would 
increase. But even in an open economy, two-thirds of output is non-traded, so that the lowering of (real) 
wages of workers can significantly lower aggregate demand.
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too high, changing wages alone would have an adverse effect—a standard result in the 
theory of the second best.
There would be long-run supply benefits once the economy was restored to equi-
librium (or to a supply-constrained situation.) The gap between aggregate supply and 
demand might accelerate price adjustments. Whether one views the change as positive 
or negative then depends on the social discount rate and the pace of adjustment to the 
full equilibrium.
But even the price adjustments might not (quickly) restore the economy towards 
equilibrium; in the short run, matters might get worse. The increased indebtedness in 
real terms (with nominal contracts) lowers both consumption and investment. Again, 
demand-side effects may dominate.82
Efficiency wage unemployment
Efficiency wages put a constraint on the (real) wages that can be offered (the no-shirk-
ing constraint). Similar results obtain in bargaining models.
(6)
Assume the product market clears, and that the constraint binds. Then:
(7)
yielding the equilibrium real wage (w/p)* and employment levels. Given the policy and 
state variables, we can solve separately for the market variables {w, p}.
In this model (where we continue to assume aggregate demand equals aggregate 
supply), the effects of policy again arise out of the aggregate supply function—which 
translates back into a demand for labour: any change that increases the level of output 
(and thus the demand for labour) at any real wage leads to lower unemployment. Thus, 
a lowering of interest rates lowers the cost of working capital and thus increases aggre-
gate supply—the willingness of firms to produce and hire labour—at each value of w/p 
(given all other variables, such as ξ ), and that leads to a higher equilibrium real wage 
and a higher level of employment.
(iii) Extending the model back in time
The current state variables for households, firms, and banks are affected by what hap-
pened in previous periods—including, of course, policies undertaken in previous peri-
ods. A model precisely like the one just posited applies to time 0 (the period before the 
current one). We focus here first not on the decisions in period 0, but on the effects of 
shocks in period 0 after decisions are taken and on government policy responses. We 
w
p




















82 This is modelling the Fisher–Greenwald–Stiglitz debt deflation effect.
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omit the equations describing period 0, focusing only on those linking events in 0 to 
state variables in period 1. There are two types of firms, those that produce with a one-
period lag (denoted by subscript a), and those that produce with no lag but require capi-
tal goods (denoted by subscript b). For one type, what is important is working capital, 
for the other it is physical capital.83 For the first type,
 
W p ra L1 1 1 0 0 0 01, , , , ,( ).= − −( ) +Y w N Wa a a  (8a)
The wealth (balance sheet) of a firm going at time 1 is total sales minus what it has to 
pay back to the bank, which is the difference between its expenditures on inputs (which 
in this aggregate model is just labour) minus its own wealth. In effect, in this simplified 
canonical model the firm takes all of its wealth and uses it for its own production.
For the second type, in this simple model, capital lives only one period.
 
W p w N K rb b L1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 01, , , , , , ,( )( ).= − ( ) − − +Y b Y K Wb b  (8b)
Thus, current prices, past and current wages, the capital stock, previous period’s pro-
duction and investment decisions, and last period’s interest rates all affect this period’s 
wealth.
Equations (8) thus explain how a shock at any date affects wealth and other state 
variables at later dates. If  prices this period are low (e.g. because of a demand shock), 
wealth will be low. That will affect investment and production, that is, both supply 
and demand. The interest rate that matters in equations (8) (and in equations (1) and 
(2) above) will be affected by shocks to the banking system. In real terms, since debt 
contracts are fixed in nominal terms, banks are better off  when the price level is lower 
than expected; worse off  if  the default rate is higher, e.g. because of an adverse shock 
to firms.
Thus, equations (8) give an additional mechanism through which government 
interventions, like an increase in G, affect the economy: an increase in G increases p, 
increasing firm wealth and decreasing firm bankruptcies, thus increasing bank wealth. 
This leads to an increase in firms’ willingness to invest and produce (i.e. a shift in the 
investment and production functions) and banks’ willingness to lend (the availability of 
credit, if  they ration, and the terms at which they make credit available).
There are other linkages across time: an increase in investment in public capital 
increases demand for goods at period t but increases productive capacities at t + 1. But 
if  the public capital goods (like roads) are complements to private capital goods (like 
railroads), then the increased investment in public capital goods today increases the 
expected return to private capital goods this period, and hence leads to more private 
investment at time t. The increased private and public capital stocks then reduce the 
employment needed to generate any level of production next period, with consequences 
that can easily be worked out.
One of the important insights of this approach is thus that aggregate demand and 
supply are intertwined. Shocks to the economy and changes in policy are likely to 
simultaneously affect both.
83 This formulation is important because one wants to have the aggregate supply curve depending on the 
interest rate and balance sheets, which it does in the working capital formulation; but one also wants to have 
real investment (‘I’) (and aggregate demand) also depending on interest rates and balance sheets.
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(iv) Extending the model forward in time
Individuals and firms are always making intertemporal choices, which were in some 
sense hidden in equations (1) and (3). As we noted in the text, while their decisions have 
consequences over time (as the previous subsection illustrates), how they behave is an 
empirical matter, i.e. the extent to which their decisions at any date are based on rules 
of thumb versus as if they solved a more complex maximization problem, is a matter 
of some dispute.84 Assume households and firms are forward looking. For instance, 
in the case of households, we summarize the expected utility of wealth carried for-
ward to the next period (the solution to a complex dynamic programming problem) by 
V(Wh,2 ; ….). Then households maximize:
U C1 1 1 1 11 1( ) + +( ) + − +( ) … ( ) V W r w N C rh( ; .),
giving the Euler equation:
U ′ = +[ ] V rw ( )1
The heart of the analysis is not so much an enquiry into the effect of changes in r, 
but of changes in uncertainty, with an increase in uncertainty (e.g. about future wages 
or employment) generating precautionary savings. A fuller analysis would focus more 
explicitly on (a) aggregating over diverse individuals, with wealth being redistributed as 
r changes; and (b) borrowing constraints and imperfections in capital markets, taking 
into account the large disparity between borrowing and lending rates. The latter means 
that for large fractions of individuals, consumption is driven by their budget constraint: 
C wN + r BB= , where rB is the borrowing rate charged these individuals, which is very 
loosely linked with r, if  at all; and B is the borrowing limit; and for still others, C wN:=  
because of the kink in the interest rate function, they neither want to be borrowers or 
lenders.
A similar analysis applies to firms, where again the focus of analysis is on risk and 
how decision variables affect future risk (including the risk of bankruptcy).
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